Your BEC wire recovery evidence has a deadline. Ensure you meet it.

Before the first call to the bank, law enforcement, or the insurer, the BEC wire recovery evidence file should hold the amount, payment timestamps, beneficiary details, bank contacts, mailbox artifacts, caller identity, the internal approver trail, and the exact moment payment instructions changed. Without those facts, outside coordination begins by reconstructing your own record.

BEC wire recovery evidence is a first-hour file

The file has to be useful before anyone outside the company accepts the theory of the loss. It should show what moved, who approved it, where it went, and which instruction made the payment depart from the ordinary course.

The bank asks for trace details. Counsel asks who knew what, and when. The insurer asks whether the payment instruction was authenticated under the policy. Law enforcement needs identifiers that can be pushed to other institutions or matched to a wider actor set.

The federal posture is moving toward more private coordination. On Aug. 13, ABA Banking Journal described a White House order directing federal law enforcement to create a program with private companies to target transnational criminal organizations behind ransomware attacks, phishing campaigns, and other cybercrimes. The White House put reported U.S. consumer losses to cyber-related crime last year at more than $20.8 billion. It also said three in four adults have experienced some kind of online scam or attack.

That may improve the chase. It does not fix a thin payment file. A government program cannot infer the beneficiary bank from a missing confirmation. A bank fraud desk cannot match a callback that was never logged. An insurer cannot accept a control narrative if the approver trail lives in chat, email, and memory.

The new chase still starts with your timestamps

Payment time is the spine of the response. If the file does not show when the instruction changed, when the payment was entered, when it was released, and when the company discovered the fraud, every other party has to work backward.

The first hour is not for a perfect investigation. It is for freezing facts while systems still show them and people have not replaced the sequence with later assumptions.

Treasury owner: payment initiation time, release time, settlement reference, wire amount, currency, originator account, receiving bank, beneficiary name, beneficiary account, and any intermediary details shown in the bank portal.

AP or vendor owner: invoice number, vendor master record before the change, vendor master record after the change, change request, effective date, and the business reason entered at the time.

Controller or finance lead: approval path, approver names, approval timestamps, exceptions granted, segregation-of-duty checks, and the person who had final authority to release funds.

IT or security owner: mailbox login history, forwarding rules, inbox rules, deleted messages, message headers, domain lookalikes, attachment hashes, and preservation status.

Business owner: phone numbers used, caller name given, callback number used, recordings if available, meeting notes, and any pressure language that changed the normal payment path.

Legal or risk owner: bank contacts called, law enforcement contacts, insurer notice time, evidence hold instructions, and a single chronology that marks facts separately from assumptions.

The list is not a formality. It is the difference between sending a bank a precise recall request and sending a story. Banks need names, account numbers, timestamps, and transaction references. Law enforcement needs artifacts that can be compared across victims. The insurer needs to see what control failed and whether the company can prove the failure without editing the record after the loss.

The incident may begin outside finance

Modern fraud often reaches finance after the real intrusion has already happened somewhere else. The payment team may see only the last instruction in a chain that began with a credential, a mailbox, a vendor portal, or a cloud account.

Gunra is a useful warning about sequence, even though ransomware is not the same fact pattern as a fraudulent payment. In the joint CISA advisory, the authoring agencies said the FBI first observed Gunra in April 2025, and that by early 2026 the group had expanded through a structured ransomware-as-a-service affiliate program advertised on dark web forums.

The mechanics are familiar to security teams and consequential for finance. Gunra actors exfiltrate sensitive victim data before encryption. Victims receive ransom notes that point them to a Tor-based negotiation portal. The actors then threaten publication on a dedicated leak site if the victim does not comply.

A company can lose confidence in its records before the payment question is even asked. The FBI observed Gunra actors obtaining initial access primarily through exploitation of known vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices, including firewall and VPN appliances. KNPA observed credential-exposure and SSH access-control vulnerabilities in internet-facing VPN gateways used for unauthorized remote access.

The finance consequence is plain. CISA urged organizations to prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, including VPN gateways and RDP-exposed infrastructure, to implement and test offline immutable backups stored separately, and to segment networks to restrict lateral movement. Those measures protect operations. They also protect evidence.

If mailboxes, shared drives, approval systems, and payment portals all fall into the same compromised path, the payment file becomes harder to trust. That is why the first-hour packet should preserve system artifacts, not screenshots alone. Screenshots are useful. Headers, logs, bank references, approval metadata, and original messages carry the chain of custody that later reviewers will test.

The Snowflake case shows why one victim becomes many

The Snowflake extortion plea shows how one credential pattern can create many corporate victims before each company understands its own loss. That matters to payment teams because the same actor set may use data theft, extortion, phishing, and re-extortion in one campaign.

Connor Riley Moucka, a 26-year-old Canadian man, pleaded guilty to computer fraud and conspiracy tied to hacking and extorting more than 165 organizations that used Snowflake, according to KrebsOnSecurity. The Justice Department described stolen login credentials used between February and October 2024 to take cloud-hosted data from at least 165 customers of a U.S.-based software-as-a-service company.

The hackers targeted Snowflake customer accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication. Snowflake responded by increasing password complexity requirements and enforcing multi-factor authentication. Moucka also admitted to stealing call and text history records of more than 100 million AT&amp;T customers.

For finance, the important part is not the brand name. It is the way victim data travels. The Justice Department said the conspirators made over $2.5 million in ransom payments, and that in at least one instance Moucka re-extorted a victim with threats of further disclosure of stolen data. Once a victim is known to have paid, the fact of payment can become part of the next approach.

That is the second fraud surface. A company that wires money, pays ransom, or responds to an extortion demand may later hear from someone claiming to recover funds, suppress data, identify the actor, or negotiate a better result. The control question is no longer only whether the first payment was fraudulent. It is whether the company can prove who is authorized to speak for recovery, who can share evidence, and who can request or approve a second payment.

Recovery pitches belong in the same control file

Any recovery approach after payment should be treated as a new incident intake. The company should log the contact, preserve the message, verify the claimed identity through an independent channel, and prevent the original approver from becoming the sole gatekeeper for a second decision.

This is where finance discipline matters more than hope. A recovery caller may know the amount, the vendor name, the sending bank, or the internal panic because those facts leaked in the first event. Knowledge is not authority. The test is whether the contact can be tied to a bank, insurer, counsel, or law enforcement contact already verified by the company.

The same rule applies to anyone asking for evidence. A real investigator, bank fraud analyst, insurer, or outside counsel may need documents quickly. Speed does not remove the need for a contact log, a verified channel, and a record of exactly what was shared.

Intake: save the original recovery message, voicemail, caller ID, email headers, portal link, and any requested deadline.

Identity check: call back through a known bank, insurer, counsel, or law enforcement number already in the company file.

Access limit: share only the evidence needed for the verified purpose, and record who approved the transfer.

Payment block: require a separate approval path for any fee, ransom, recovery charge, or third-party retainer tied to the incident.

Chronology update: mark the recovery contact as a new event with its own timestamp, owner, and verification result.

The implication is uncomfortable for a well-run finance team. Your response plan is only as strong as the first packet a tired employee can assemble under pressure. If that packet is owned by nobody until the loss is found, the new public and private machinery may arrive to find the trail already cooling inside your own systems.