Whoever gives the final "go" to release a payment needs to be approving the payment method that's actually being used, not just the one that was approved earlier in the process.

Here's the problem it's solving: sometimes a payment gets approved to go out through one channel (say, a wire transfer), but then a routing system decides to reroute it through a different channel (like a card network or ACH) before it actually goes out. If that switch happens, the system shouldn't just quietly send the payment through the new route using the old approval.

Instead, before the payment actually goes out, the system should re-surface everything that matters: Who's getting paid? Was this properly approved? Were any red flags cleared? Does someone have the authority to release this specific version of the payment?

The routing system can change how the payment is formatted or transmitted — but it shouldn't be treated as the thing that approved the payment. Approval has to come from a real authority check, not just from the fact that a system successfully rerouted it.

Route choice is an authority event

A hub weakens control when route selection is treated as delivery work. The same payable can carry a different risk when the hub changes the settlement instrument, message fields, exception path, or recovery posture.

The instruction starts as a business record. An invoice is entered. A supplier portal submits account details. A requester asks finance to pay.

The control question is whether the payee, obligation, approval, route, and release are all supported by current evidence. That record has to survive translation.

A hub may convert one approved obligation into a card instruction, bank transfer, instant payment, or cross border file. Each route asks for different fields. Each route has different stop points and exception handling. If the hub reduces the record to name, account, amount, and routing data, it may create a valid payment message while stripping out the evidence needed to reject it.

Business email compromise and vendor impersonation exploit that split. The attacker does not need to beat every control. The attacker needs the decisive control to sit in a queue that cannot see the prior record.

Payee verification is a check, not a release decision. It may support the payee record. It does not prove that the current instruction, route change, exception clearance, and final release were authorized.

The veto belongs at final release

The veto belongs at final release because that is the last human control before liquidity leaves. Earlier gates still matter, but they should feed the release decision instead of replacing it.

The clean design is a chain of named gates. Each gate has an owner, and each owner sees the evidence required for that decision.

Instruction capture, accounts payable or requesting business owner: confirm the commercial obligation, invoice source, purchase order link where used, and requester identity.

Payee authority, vendor master owner: confirm supplier identity, approved settlement instrument, change request path, and independent callback or portal evidence where policy requires it.

Approval authority, controller or delegated approver: confirm approval limit, segregation from the requester, and any policy exception.

Rail selection, treasury operations: record the selected route, the fields changed, and whether the route changes finality, recall, fees, currency, or beneficiary detail.

Fraud and sanctions review, financial crime or fraud operations: review alerts against the authority packet, not only against the payment message.

Exception handling, independent case owner: document the alert, the evidence reviewed, the person clearing it, and why clearance is valid for the route used.

Final release, treasury release owner or bank administrator: verify that payee authority, approval authority, route approval, and exception clearance are current.

Recall or recovery, treasury operations and bank contact owner: preserve release evidence, bank references, counterparty records, and the decision trail.

The release owner should not be asked to infer authority from a payment file. The file should point back to the instruction, payee record, approval, routing decision, and exception record.

A hub that cannot present that chain at release has moved the fraud veto away from the evidence.

A rail change can stale an earlier approval

A rail change can stale an earlier check when it alters the data, instrument, beneficiary path, or practical recovery options. The check may have been valid when performed, then incomplete once the route changed.

Start with the supplier record. A vendor master team may approve account details for a standard bank transfer. Treasury may later route the same obligation to a card product. The issue is not that one route is inherently weaker. The issue is that the earlier payee check may not have approved that instrument, merchant path, or exception treatment.

The same failure appears in reverse. A card payment fails. The hub reroutes to an account payment. The original approval may have assumed card controls, dispute handling, or spend limits. The new route may require a different beneficiary field and a different release process.

If the hub treats the reroute as a delivery choice, the approval no longer answers the full question.

Instant routing creates a sharper release problem. There is less practical time to catch an error after dispatch. That does not bar the route. It means the authority record must be current before release, and exception clearance must attach to the exact message being sent.

Cross border routing can change beneficiary format, intermediary path, currency handling, and screening workflow. A name match at payee setup may not answer whether the final beneficiary, account identifier, and payment purpose still match the approved obligation. A sanctions or fraud queue that sees only message fields can catch some issues. It cannot validate commercial authority.

The failure sequence is plain after the money leaves. The business approved a real invoice. A payee check was completed. A routing rule changed the rail. A field was reformatted. An alert appeared in a specialist queue. The specialist cleared the item because the data in that queue looked ordinary. Final release occurred without a current route authority check.

The control did not fail because no one looked. It failed because each person looked at a different slice.

The documents must make separate claims

The payment does not need every attachment at every step. It needs structured evidence showing who authorized the payee, who authorized the obligation, who authorized the route, and who released the payment.

An invoice states what a vendor claims is due. A purchase order states what the business agreed to buy. A vendor master record states where the company has chosen to pay. A delegation matrix states who may approve. A bank mandate or portal role states who may release. An exception case states why a warning was cleared.

Those claims should not collapse into one green status. A green supplier status does not prove the current bank detail was approved. A green invoice status does not prove the route is acceptable. A green screening status does not prove release authority.

The authority packet should be small enough to move with the payment and precise enough to support a veto. It should include the instruction identifier, payee identifier, approved settlement instrument, approval chain, route selected, route change reason, screening result, exception case reference, and final release identity.

The packet also needs expiry rules. A payee change approval should not remain valid for an unrelated route change. An approval obtained before a beneficiary field was rewritten should not clear the rewritten payment. An exception clearance should not survive a new route unless the case owner reviewed the changed message.

This is not a call for more manual review. It is a call for fewer blind handoffs. The hub can automate routing, formatting, enrichment, and dispatch. It should not remove the evidence needed to say no.

If your hub can reroute a payable after approval, routing is a release relevant event. No final dispatch should occur unless the veto holder can see the original authority, the current payee evidence, and the specific route now being used.